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Effects of Channel Structure on the Quality Competition
of Exclusively Distributed Products*
Yeong Seon Kang**

This study investigates the effects of the distribution channel structure on quality decisions under
duopoly competition. I considers a set-up in which two retailers compete on product quality and
retail price. In the set-up, the integrated retailer has the power to determine the quality of its
exclusive product, while the decentralized retailer does not. For the decentralized retailer, the supplier
determines product quality. I find that asymmetric pairs of a decentralized channel by one retailer
and an integrated channel by the other retailer can be a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneouschannel-choice model. The two retailers select different levels of quality, and this quality competition
benefits retailers by softening price competition. In a sequential-channel-choice model, I find that
the leader can obtain a first-mover advantage. From the perspective of the supplier, which can
decide the distribution channel structure and level of quality, both suppliers choose the decentralized
channel in equilibrium.
Key words: Product Quality, Distribution Channel, Horizontal Differentiation, Game Theory

been continuously released in the market. When

Ⅰ. Introduction

we consider private brand products, the industry
and market have focused on price competition
Today, many retailers exclusively sell specific

based on relatively low quality and low price.

brands (either store/private brands or other

Recently, however, retailers have introduced

exclusive brands) in their own stores to various

exclusively distributed products with improved

degrees of success. Owing to the long-term

quality in order to increase store traffic and

global recession, these exclusive brands have

enhance the retailer’s brand image (Gielens et
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and product evaluation. When consumers have

al. 2014).
These exclusive products for a specific retailer

strong loyalty to retailers, they provide a

can help it attract more customer traffic to the

relatively positive evaluation of store brand

store and strengthen customer loyalty (Corstjens

products.

and Lal 2000). For example, BestBuy, the

This study uses analytical modeling to

largest electronics retailer in the world, is

investigate the consumer’s store loyalty and

considering expanding its exclusive product line

product quality of exclusively distributed products

to reinvent its brand and improve profitability

as key variables from the perspective of

(Burritt 2012). Steenkamp and Dekimpe (1997)

retailers. My research starts from the question

show that a consumer loyal to an exclusive

of who controls the quality of the exclusive

store brand is more likely to be loyal to that

products that retailers carry in their stores. For

store. Binninger (2008) also shows that a

example, in one case, the retailer may control

consumer’s loyalty to an exclusive product in a

product quality, while in another, an upstream

particular store is positively related to his or

supplier may be an independent strategic player

her loyalty to the store. Hence, exclusive

controlling product quality and setting wholesale

products may contribute to the store’s ability

prices for the retailer. The level of quality may

to differentiate itself (Bonfrer et al. 2004;

thus depend on who makes the decision. I

Collins-Dodd and Lindley 2003). On the

investigate how the distribution channel structure

contrary, when retailers’ strategies focus on

affects the level of quality decision and how

low price/low quality to target price-sensitive

the level of quality affects the consumer’s

consumers, this can have a negative impact on

decision given his or her loyalty to a retailer.

a consumer’s store loyalty (Gielens et al. 2014;

From this perspective, this study examines the

Peres and Van den Bulte 2014). Product

effects of the distribution channel structure on

quality is one of the most significant attributes

quality decisions, considering competition at

of the purchase/repurchase decision for building

both the retailer and the supplier levels.

consumer loyalty (Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal

While the analytical modeling literature refers

1990; Aaker 1993). The quality of an exclusive

to quality differentiation as vertical differentiation,

product might thus be the key factor to

I incorporate quality differentiation with a

achieving loyalty, and a higher level of quality

quality weight on the consumer’s loyalty to a

might enhance a customer’s store loyalty.

retailer in a consumer’s utility function for a

Some empirical research (Ailawadi et al. 2008;

product bought from that retailer. For example,

Gonzales-Benito and Martos-Partal 2012) finds

Trader Joe’s, a grocery store chain in the United

a relationship between a consumer’s store loyalty

States, is gaining popularity among consumers
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looking for healthy and/or organic foods at

reasons why decentralization may be optimal

affordable prices. Charles Shaw wine, exclusively

under relatively high competition at the product

distributed by Trader Joe’s, is rated as excellent

level. They find that the optimal channel

quality at an affordable price ($1.99–$2.99/

depends on product substitutability and explain

bottle). Consumers’ perceived quality towards

that decentralization has a “buffer effect” on

Charles Shaw wine could be influenced by

competition. Moorthy (1988) shows that the

their loyalty to the distributor, Trader Joe’s. If

necessary condition for decentralization to be a

a consumer has strong loyalty to Trader Joe’s,

Nash equilibrium strategy is a function of the

he or she may perceive one of its products as

effect of strategic interaction on a manufacturer’s

being of higher quality compared with the

channel structure decision. He finds that

actual quality (Cholette 2004). Perceived quality

decentralization is a Nash equilibrium strategy

can be assumed by consumers’ subjective

if the manufacturer’s products are demand

evaluations based on their store loyalty.

substitutes and strategic complements at the

This study is related to the literature on

manufacturer or retailer level or if the manufacturer’s

distribution channel selection. The issues associated

products are demand complements and strategic

with optimal channel selection have been

substitutes at the manufacturer or retailer

explored extensively. In a monopoly case, vertical

level. Coughlan and Wernerfelt (1989) show

integration is optimal, because the decentralized

that decentralization gives a manufacturer the

channel has the double marginalization problem.

ability to become a Stackelberg leader in the

In a duopoly case, several researchers have

channel, which drives decentralization to be

studied optimal channel selection between vertical

optimal. Trivedi (1998) compares three channel

integration and decentralization (McGuire and

mechanisms: the vertically integrated channel,

Staelin 1983; Moorthy 1988; Coughlan 1985;

the decentralized channel, and the fully symmetric

Coughlan and Wernerfelt 1989; Trivedi 1998;

channel. She shows that the fully symmetric

Liu and Tyagi 2009; Zhao, Atkins, and Liu

channel is always superior to the decentralized

2009).

channel, considering the competition between

McGuire and Staelin (1983) compare three

stores and products.

types of channel structures: vertically integrated,

Liu and Tyagi (2009) also show how

decentralized, and mixed (in which one

downstream firms can benefit from upward

manufacturer distributes products through a

channel decentralization when their product

private retailer and the other manufacturer

positioning is endogenous. When product positioning

distributes products through its own stores).

is endogenous, upward channel decentralization

They introduce competition as one of the

induces more differentiation between firms. As

Effects of Channel Structure on the Quality Competition of Exclusively Distributed Products 39

a result, price competition at the downstream

answer the following questions: (1) Does a

level is softened and downstream firms can

distribution channel structure play a role in

achieve higher profits. While Liu and Tyagi

this product quality decision? (2) Should the

(2009) show how decentralization can reach

product quality of the two retailers with

equilibrium under horizontal differentiation and

asymmetric distribution channel structures differ?

endogenous product positioning, Zhao et al.

(3) When and how does a retailer benefit

(2009) examine the impact of channel structure

from decentralization in a set-up in which I

under vertical differentiation and endogenous

consider the interaction effect between a

quality positioning. They assume that two

consumer’s loyalty and the level of product

firms are vertically differentiated (i.e., a high-

quality? (4) When I consider that retailers

quality firm vs. a low-quality firm). Changes

choose their distribution channel structure

in channel structure have asymmetric effects

sequentially instead of simultaneously, does a

on the firm’s original quality positioning. While

first-mover advantage exist? (5) When I consider

the product quality of the high-quality firm

a set-up in which suppliers make the quality

decreases when it decentralizes, the product

decision instead of retailers, how does it affect

quality of the low-quality firm increases when

the equilibrium outcome of the distribution

it decentralizes. They find that because the

channel structure?

benefit of differentiating one’s product from

I find that asymmetric pairs of a decentralized

that of the competitor is greater than the

channel by one retailer and an integrated

benefit of adopting a decentralized channel,

channel by the other retailer can be Nash

decentralization cannot be sustained in quality-

equilibria in the simultaneous-channel-choice

differentiated and endogenous quality positioning.

model. When the market is covered and

I consider a set-up in which two retailers

competition between retailers exists, the two

compete on quality and retail price. A retailer

retailers choose asymmetric pairs of distribution

can adopt either an integrated channel structure

channel structures and given this asymmetric

in which it functions as the manufacturer or a

channel, they choose different levels of quality.

decentralized channel structure in which an

Therefore, this quality competition benefits

upstream supplier produces the product for the

retailers by softening price competition. However,

retailer. The integrated retailer has the power

this result cannot be sustained if a retailer

to determine its product quality, while the

plays the role of a local monopolist. When the

decentralized retailer does not. For the decentralized

market is not covered, both retailers in equilibrium

retailer, the supplier determines product quality

choose the integrated channel because of the

and wholesale price. In this study, I attempt to

double marginalization problem (McGuire and
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Staelin 1983; Moorthy 1988). Specifically, in a

previous stage. I consider both the simultaneous

sequential-channel-choice model, I find that

and the sequential moves of the retailers. In

when the market is covered, the leader-retailer

the simultaneous-channel-choice model, the

chooses the integrated channel and the follower-

two retailers choose the distribution channel

retailer chooses the decentralized channel,

structure simultaneously. In the sequential-

meaning that the leader can obtain a first-

channel-choice model, one retailer chooses its

mover advantage. Changing to the supplier’s

distribution channel structure before the other

perspective to decide the distribution channel

retailer. The model assumptions are described

structure and level of quality, the results are

below.

different from the perspective of retailers.
While asymmetric pairs of distribution channel

2.1 Retailers

structures can reach the equilibrium outcomes
from the retailer’s perspective, symmetric pairs

I assume that the two retailers, A and B, are

of distribution channel structures are the

located at 0 and 1 along the unit line in the

equilibrium outcomes from the perspective of

interval [0, 1], respectively. The marginal

suppliers. When the market is covered and

production cost of quality is assumed to be

competition between the channels exists, both

    . I assume that products of a higher

suppliers choose the decentralized channel in

level of quality are costlier to produce. Either

equilibrium. When the market is not covered

upstream suppliers produce products for the

and each channel plays the role of a local

retailer, which are integrated (integrated, denoted

monopolist, both suppliers choose the integrated

by I), or the retailer operates independently

channel in equilibrium.

(decentralized, denoted by D). The distribution
channel structure II denotes when the two
retailers are integrated, DD when the two

Ⅱ. The Model

retailers are decentralized, and ID for competition
between the integrated and decentralized channels.
When integrated, retailer        sets its

Consider a market with two retailers  

own level of quality. When decentralized, supplier

    selling a product with quality 

 sets the level of quality and wholesale price,

         , respectively. These retailers

and retailer  purchases from supplier  at

choose the channel distribution structures and

wholesale price   .

then the strategic variables depending on the
channel distribution structures selected in the
Effects of Channel Structure on the Quality Competition of Exclusively Distributed Products 41

for a consumer located at    , the net

2.2 Consumers

utility that the consumer receives from buying
I assume that consumers are distributed

a product from Retailer A is      ,

uniformly along the unit line in the interval [0,

while the net utility that the consumer receives

1] and the total number of consumers is

from buying a product from Retailer B is

normalized to 1. Consumers have relative

     . A consumer located at   

loyalty to each retailer   . The level of

has relatively strong loyalty to Retailer A and

quality,           , plays the role

his or her utility is positively related to his or

of a weight on the loyalty to each retailer.

her loyalty as well as weighted by each

Net utility for a consumer located at  from

retailer’s level of quality. As the retailer’s level

purchasing Retailer A’s product is     

of quality rises, the consumer’s utility increases;

       . For Retailer B’s product, net

however, this increase depends on his or her

utility is          . I assume that  is

relative loyalty to Retailers A and B.

a reservation value and        is the
retail price of each retailer’s product.  

2.3 Sequence of the Game

represents the consumer’s utility based on
relative loyalty and each retailer’s level of

In the simultaneous-channel-choice model
presented in Section 3, the sequence of the

quality.
Consumers have perfect information about

game is as follows. First, the retailers set the

the levels of quality and prices. If they decide

distribution channel structure. They decide

to buy, they buy one unit of the product that

whether to integrate or decentralize their

provides the highest utility. If the utility

upstream supplier. Second, either the retailer

obtainable from the two retailers is less than

with the integrated channel or the supplier

zero, then they will buy the outside good and

with the decentralized channel chooses the

the consumer’s utility from the outside good is

product quality level. Third, the suppliers (in

assumed to be zero.

the case of decentralized channels) set wholesale

Intuitively, if I assume that a consumer is

prices   . Fourth, the retailers simultaneously

located at    , then the net utility that the

set retail prices  . Fifth, consumers decide

consumer receives from buying a product from

which products to purchase.

Retailer A is      , while the net utility

By contrast, in Section 5, I consider the

that the consumer receives from buying a

sequential-channel-choice model, in which the

product from Retailer B is    . Similarly,

leader-retailer chooses the distribution channel

42 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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structure before the other retailer. The follower

consumer buy from Retailer A, whereas all

chooses the distribution channel structure after

consumers between the marginal consumer

it observes the leader’s distribution channel

and 1 buy from Retailer B.

structure. Second, either the retailer with the
integrated channel or the supplier with the
decentralized channel chooses the product
quality level. Third, the suppliers (in the case

3.1 Quality Decision under the
Integrated vs. Integrated Channel
Structure

of decentralized channels) set wholesale prices
  . Fourth, the retailers simultaneously set

I first study the case in which both the

retail prices  . Fifth, consumers decide which

retailers produce their own products. Let  

products to purchase.

and   represent the profits of Retailers A
and B, respectively:

Ⅲ. Simultaneous Move Game:
Market Is Covered

        ;       .

The retailers choose their retail prices to
maximize profits, taking the equilibrium levels

I use backward induction to solve the subgame
perfect equilibrium for prices and levels of
quality. I assume that the consumer’s reservation
value,  , is sufficiently large so that all
consumers buy one of the two products and
the market is covered.
To calculate the demand function, I derive

of quality as given. Solving the first-order
conditions of profit maximization gives the
following price reaction functions:


            ,



            .


the indifference point at which the marginal

I substitute the price reaction functions into

consumer is indifferent between the two

the profit functions and then Retailers A and

retailers. The indifference point is given by

B choose the level of quality to maximize
profits. The equilibrium levels of quality are

      

  .
  

obtained by solving the first-order conditions
simultaneously.

Let   and   denote the range of demand
for the products of Retailers A and B, respectively.

I find the following optimal level of quality,
retail prices, and retailers’ profits:

All consumers between zero and the marginal
Effects of Channel Structure on the Quality Competition of Exclusively Distributed Products 43



     ,        ,



       .


I substitute the price reaction functions into
the supplier’s profit functions and then Suppliers
A and B choose the wholesale prices to
maximize profits. Solving the first-order conditions

3.2 Quality Decision under the
Decentralized vs. Decentralized
Channel Structure
I now consider the case in which both the
retailers choose the decentralized channel. Each

of the supplier’s profit maximization gives the
following wholesale price reaction functions:


            ,



            .


decentralized supplier chooses its level of quality

By substituting the wholesale price reaction

and then its wholesale price to maximize its

functions into the supplier’s profit functions, I

profits. Each retailer chooses the retail price

calculate the first-order conditions to maximize

that maximizes its profits given the levels of

the supplier’s profit functions with respect to

quality and wholesale prices. In this model, the

the level of quality. Equilibrium levels of

suppliers are Stackelberg leaders. Let   and

quality are obtained by solving the first-order

  represent the profits of Retailers A and B,

conditions simultaneously.

and   and   represent the profits of
Suppliers A and B, respectively:

I find the following optimal levels of quality,
wholesale prices, retail prices, suppliers’ profits,
and retailers’ profits:

         ,
         ;       .

The retailers choose their retail prices to
maximize profits, taking the equilibrium wholesale
prices and levels of quality as given. Solving



     ,        ,




       ,



       ,        .



the first-order conditions of profit maximization
gives the following price reaction functions:


              ,



              .
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3.3 Quality Decision under the
Integrated vs. Decentralized
Channel Structure
Without loss of generality, I assume that

Retailer A chooses the integrated channel and
Retailer B chooses the decentralized channel.
The integrated retailer sets its retail price to
maximize its profit given the level of quality.
Let   represent the profit of Retailer A:



            .


By substituting the retail price reaction
function into Retailer A’s profit function and
substituting the wholesale price reaction function
into Supplier B’s profit function, I calculate the

        .

first-order conditions to maximize the profit

Decentralized Retailer B sets its retail price

functions of Retailer A and Supplier B with

to maximize its profit given the level of quality

respect to the level of quality. The equilibrium

and its wholesale price. Decentralized Supplier

levels of quality are obtained by solving the

B chooses its level of quality and then sets its

first-order conditions simultaneously.

wholesale price to maximize its profit. Let  

I find the following optimal levels of quality,

and   represent the profits of Retailer B and

wholesale prices, retail prices, suppliers’ profits,
and retailers’ profits:

Supplier B, respectively:




   ,    ,     ,




         ,
         .



   ,    ,



Solving the first-order conditions of the
retailers’ profit maximization gives the following




    ,     ,     .




price reaction functions:


             ,



             .


3.4 Equilibrium Outcomes and
Comparisons
By using the results presented in the previous
sections, I compare the equilibrium results for

I substitute the price reaction functions into

quality, price, and profit. The outcomes for the

Supplier B’s profit function and then Supplier

levels of quality, retail prices, and retailers’

B chooses the wholesale price to maximize

profits under the three distribution channel

profits. Solving the first-order conditions for

structures are summarized in Table 1.

Supplier B’s profit maximization gives the
following wholesale price reaction function:

Consumers are better off in the integrated
channel than in the decentralized channel. As
shown in Table 1, the channel structure of II

Effects of Channel Structure on the Quality Competition of Exclusively Distributed Products 45

<Table 1> Outcomes of Quality, Retail Prices, and Retailers’ Profits under the Three Distribution Channel
Structures in the Simultaneous-Channel-Choice Model
(when the market is covered,  is sufficiently large)
ID

Channel Structure

II

DD

I

D

Quality

















Retail Price

















Profit

















has the lowest retail price. If the channel is

Proposition 1

decentralized, its price increases because of the

(simultaneous-channel-choice model):

double marginalization problem. Decentralization

When the consumer’s reservation value,  , is

leads to higher retail prices for consumers.

sufficiently large so that the market is covered,

Since the market is covered, each retailer has

there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. In

half of the market share under the symmetric

a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, one retailer

condition. Because the two retailers have

chooses the integrated channel and the other

much higher retail prices under DD, they have

retailer chooses the decentralized channel, or

higher profits under DD than under II.

vice versa.

Under the channel structure of ID, the
integrated retailer can charge a higher retail

Surprisingly, I find that decentralization does

price than the decentralized retailer as it offers

not always reduce the retailer’s profit and that

a higher level of quality and thus is attractive

an asymmetric channel structure can reach

to quality-sensitive consumers. Under this

equilibrium. The two retailers choose an asymmetric

condition, the decentralized retailer offers a

strategy in a pure-strategy equilibrium. If one

lower level of quality and a lower retail price.

retailer chooses the integrated channel, then

By doing so, it focuses on quality-insensitive

the other retailer prefers the decentralized

and price-sensitive consumers.

channel in equilibrium. Given this asymmetric

Proposition 1 summarizes the equilibrium

channel structure, the two retailers choose

outcome for the channel structure decision in

different levels of quality, and quality competition

the simultaneous-channel-choice model under

benefits these retailers by softening price

the condition of the market being covered.

competition. Channel decentralization can thus
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lead to more quality differentiation, which can
soften price competition.

All consumers between zero and   buy
from Retailer A, whereas all consumers between

  and 1 buy from Retailer B. Consumers

Ⅳ. Simultaneous Move Game:
Market Is Not Covered

between   and 
  buy an outside good,
from which their utility is zero. To ensure
meaningful results, the following assumption is
necessary:

In the previous section, I computed the
market-covered equilibrium for the simultaneouschannel-choice model. In this section, I compute
the equilibrium when the market is not covered
and the two retailers choose their distribution
channel structures simultaneously. In this case,

Assumption: 
  
 .
For this assumption to hold, the reservation
value,  , should be greater than zero and less

than  .


the two retailers act as local monopolists and
some markets are not covered by either retailer.
I use backward induction to solve the subgame
perfect equilibrium for prices and levels of

4.1 Quality Decision under the
Integrated vs. Integrated Channel
Structure

quality.
To derive the demand function, I calculate

I first study the case in which both the

the boundary of Retailer A’s market demand

retailers choose the integrated distribution

in which a consumer is indifferent between

channel structure. Let   and   represent

Retailer A’s product and an outside good:
     

   .


the profits of Retailers A and B, respectively:
       
 ,
        
  .

Similarly, the boundary of Retailer B’s market
demand, in which a consumer is indifferent

The retailers choose their retail prices to

between Retailer B’s product and an outside

maximize profits, taking the equilibrium levels

good, is

of quality as given. Solving the first-order
conditions of profit maximization gives the




  
 .


price reaction functions. By substituting the
price reaction functions into the profit functions,

Effects of Channel Structure on the Quality Competition of Exclusively Distributed Products 47

the equilibrium levels of quality are obtained

quality and wholesale prices. In this model, the

by solving the first-order conditions of profit

suppliers are Stackelberg leaders. Let   and

maximization with respect to the levels of

  represent the profits of Retailers A and B,

quality.

and   and   represent the profits of

I find the following optimal level of quality,

Suppliers A and B, respectively:

retail prices, and retailers’ profits:

        
    ,


        
     ,


          
     ,



       .


        


,
         
  ,
        
 ,
         
  .

Using backward induction to solve the subgame
perfect equilibrium for prices and levels of
quality yields the following optimal levels of

Since the retailers first choose the distribution
channel structure and then set the level of

quality, wholesale prices, retail prices, suppliers’
profits, retailers’ profits, and market shares:

quality, they end up choosing the same level
of quality and have the same resulting profit.
Although I assume that the market is not
covered, the market is covered by an outcome
and each retailer’s market share thus becomes
half of the market.

4.2 Quality Decision under the
Decentralized vs. Decentralized
Channel Structure


        
    ,


          
     ,


        
     ,

  
    
      
,
  
   
  
    
      
,
  
   

          
    .


I now consider the case in which both the
retailers choose the decentralized channel. Each
decentralized supplier chooses its level of quality
and then its wholesale price to maximize its

4.3 Quality Decision under the
Integrated vs. Decentralized
Channel Structure

profits. Each retailer chooses the retail price
that maximizes its profits given the levels of
48 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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Without loss of generality, I assume that

Retailer A chooses the integrated channel and
Retailer B chooses the decentralized channel.
The integrated retailer sets its retail price to
maximize its profit given the level of quality.
Let   represent the profit of Retailer A:

  
    
   
,
   
   
   
    
   
,
   
   


       
    ,



       
    .


       
 .

The decentralized retailer sets its retail price
to maximize its profit given the level of quality
and its wholesale price. The decentralized
supplier chooses its level of quality and then
sets its wholesale price to maximize its profit.
Let   and   represent the profits of
Retailer B and Supplier B:
         
  ,
         
  .

4.4 Equilibrium Outcomes and
Comparisons
By using the results presented in the previous
sections, I compare the equilibrium results of
quality, price, and profit. The outcomes of
levels of quality, retail prices, and retailers’
profits under the three distribution channel
structures are summarized in Table 2.
Since each retailer acts as a local monopolist

Using backward induction to solve the

in the case of the market being uncovered, the

subgame perfect equilibrium for prices and

channel member decides the level of quality

levels of quality yields the following optimal

independently without reacting to the competitor’s

levels of quality, wholesale prices, retail prices,

strategy. As a result, levels of quality are the

suppliers’ profits, retailers’ profits, and market

same under any distribution channel structure.

shares:

Because of double marginalization, under the
decentralized channel, the retailers charge a


        
    ,


       
     ,


      
     ,


      
     ,

   
    
   
,
   
   

higher retail price than under the integrated
channel. Proposition 2 summarizes the results
of the equilibrium channel structure decision in
the simultaneous-channel-choice model under
the condition of the market being uncovered.
Proposition 2
(simultaneous-channel-choice model):

Effects of Channel Structure on the Quality Competition of Exclusively Distributed Products 49

When the consumer’s reservation value,  , is

With the condition of the market being uncovered,



the equilibrium is that both the retailers choose

sufficiently small       so that the


the integrated channel structure; these results

market is not covered, both the retailers

are consistent with those of previous studies.

simultaneously choose the integrated channel

Surprisingly, although I assume that the

in equilibrium.

market is not covered under the condition of

As shown in the previous section with the


     , the market is covered as an


condition of the market being covered, an

outcome under the condition in which both the

asymmetric channel structure can benefit the

retailers choose an integrated channel structure.

retailers by competing on quality differentiation

As a result, their profits under the II structure

and softening price competition. However,

are higher than those under the DD structure

when both the retailers play the role of local

because the retailers have higher channel

monopolists under the condition of the market

efficiency and higher market share.

being uncovered, each retailer’s channel efficiency
has a more critical role than the role of
competition between the retailers in the decision

Ⅴ. Sequential Move Game:
Market Is Covered

on the optimal channel structure. In a monopoly,
the vertically integrated channel is optimal
because of the double marginalization problem

In the previous section, I examined the

(McGuire and Staelin 1983; Moorthy 1988).

<Table 2> Outcomes of Quality, Retail Prices, and Retailers’ Profits under the Three Distribution Channel
Structures in the Simultaneous-Channel-Choice Model



(when the market is not covered,      )
Structure

Quality

Retail Price

Profit

II


  
   




  
    



DD


  
   




  
    




  
    


  
     

  
   

I


  
   




  
    



D


  
   




  
    



ID
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simultaneous-channel-choice model. Now, I

that all consumers buy one of the two products

analyze the sequential-channel-choice-model

and thus, by definition, the market is covered.

in which one retailer chooses its distribution

Without loss of generality, I assume that

channel structure before the other retailer. The

Retailer A is the leader and Retailer B is the

choices of the levels of quality and prices are

follower in this sequential-channel-choice-model.

still simultaneous. In other words, the leader-

Figure 1 presents the distribution channel

retailer first chooses the distribution channel

choices of Retailers A and B.

structure, and then the follower-retailer observes

In the sequential-channel-choice model, the

the leader-retailer’s distribution channel structure

results of the optimal levels of quality, prices,

and chooses its own distribution channel

and profits are equivalent to the results

structure. Second, the product quality level is

obtained under the simultaneous-channel-choice

chosen by either the retailer in the integrated

model in the sense that the two retailers or

channel or the supplier in the decentralized

suppliers choose their levels of quality and prices

channel. Third, the suppliers (in the case of

under a given distribution channel structure.

decentralized channels) set wholesale prices

With the sequential-channel-choice model, the

  . Fourth, the retailers simultaneously set

outcome when both the retailers choose the

retail prices  . Fifth, consumers decide which

integrated channel is

products to purchase.
I want to understand whether a first-mover
advantage exists. I assume that the consumer’s
reservation value,  , is sufficiently large so



       ,        ,



          .


<Figure 1> The Sequential-Channel-Choice Model
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When both the retailers choose the decentralized

channel.

channel, the outcome is

        ,


           ,







As shown in the previous section, there are
two equilibria: one retailer chooses the integrated
channel and the other retailer chooses the
decentralized channel, or vice versa. In the


        ,


sequential-channel-choice model, the only


           ,


the integrated channel and the follower chooses

equilibrium outcome is that the leader chooses
the decentralized channel. This result shows


           .


that the leader can choose the distribution

When one retailer chooses the integrated
channel structure and the other retailer chooses
the decentralized channel structure, the following
optimal levels of quality, wholesale prices, retail
prices, suppliers’ profits, and retailers’ profits
result:

channel to defend itself against a future follower
entrant and thus gain a first-mover advantage.
In the sequential-channel-choice model, the
leader-retailer is better off under the integrated
channel because the leader can anticipate that
the follower will choose the decentralized channel
given the leader’s choice of the integrated





   ,    ,     ,    ,





channel. The decentralized follower has higher
profits than it would under the integrated channel





   ,     ,     ,    





when the leader chooses the integrated channel

Proposition 3 summarizes the results of the

channel structure, the two retailers choose

equilibrium channel structure decision in the

different levels of quality, and this quality

sequential-channel-choice model under the

differentiation benefits both retailers by softening

condition of the market being covered.

price competition.



before the follower. Given this asymmetric

Proposition 3
(sequential-channel-choice model):

Ⅵ. Perspective of Suppliers

When the consumer’s reservation value,  , is
sufficiently large so that the market is covered,
the leader-retailer chooses the integrated channel

So far, I have examined the channel decision

and the follower-retailer chooses the decentralized

problem from the perspective of retailers, as

52 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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retailers were the decision makers choosing the

suppliers distribute their products directly. In

structure for their whole channel. Now, I examine

other words, they both choose an integrated

the channel decision problem from the perspective

channel structure. The two suppliers set their

of suppliers, which is equivalent to the case

levels of quality simultaneously to maximize

analyzed in McGuire and Staelin (1983).

their profits. Then, the two suppliers set their

I assume that a supplier distributes its product

retail prices simultaneously to maximize their

directly or through a retailer. In the first case,

profits given the levels of quality. Backward

both the suppliers distribute their products

induction yields the following levels of quality,

directly. In this integrated case, the two

retail prices, and suppliers’ profits:

suppliers choose the levels of quality and then
set retail prices. In the decentralized case, the
two suppliers choose the levels of quality and
set the wholesale prices they charge their own
retailer. Each retailer in the decentralized channel

When the market is covered (when  is
sufficiently large):



   ,    ,     .




chooses the retail price to maximize its profits.
I consider the cases of the market being
covered and uncovered. When the consumer’s
reservation value,  , is sufficiently large, all
consumers buy one of the two products and
the market is covered. When the consumer’s

When the market is not covered (when  is


sufficiently small,      ):



    

    ,


reservation value,  , is sufficiently small



    

     ,



      , the two channels act as local




     
 
      .


monopolists and some markets are not covered
I now consider the case in which both the

by either retailer.
I use backward induction to solve the subgame

suppliers choose the decentralized channel.

perfect equilibrium for prices and levels of

Under decentralized channel structures, these

quality. From the perspective of suppliers, the

two suppliers set their levels of quality

computation of demand functions, levels of

simultaneously to maximize their profits. Then,

quality, prices, and profits is consistent with

they both set their wholesale prices to be

the case of the perspective of retailers in the

charged to their retailers. Both the retailers set

sense of the specification of demand.

their retail prices simultaneously to maximize

I first study the case in which both the

their profits. Backward induction yields the
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following levels of quality, wholesale prices,
retail prices, suppliers’ profits, and retailers’


    .


profits:

When the market is covered (when  is
sufficiently large):


 


  




  ,      ,     ,





  ,      .



When the market is not covered (when  is


sufficiently small,      ):



 




   ,     ,     ,





    
    ,





 
            ,





             ,

   
    
    
,
   
   
   
    
    
.
   
   

When the market is not covered (when  is


sufficiently small,      ):



     
  
    ,



     
 
      ,


     
     ,



     

      ,

  
    
   
,
   
   
   
    

 ,
 
   
   
   
    

 .
 
   
   

By using the results presented in the previous
sections, I now compare the optimal outcomes

When one supplier chooses the integrated

of quality, prices, and profits. The outcomes of

channel structure and the other supplier

levels of quality, retail prices, wholesale prices,

chooses the decentralized channel structure,

and suppliers’ profits under the three distribution

the following levels of quality, wholesale prices,

channel structure types are summarized in

retail prices, suppliers’ profits, and retailers’

Tables 3 and Table 4. Since each retailer acts

profits result:

as a local monopolist in the case of the market
being uncovered, each decides the level of

When the market is covered (when  is
sufficiently large):


competitor’s strategy. As a result, the levels of





  ,    ,     ,    ,
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quality are the same as under any of the

choose the decentralized channel in

distribution channel structures in Table 2.

equilibrium.

Proposition 4 summarizes the results of the
equilibrium channel structure decision from the

ⅱ) When the consumer’s reservation value,

 , is sufficiently small       so


perspective of the supplier.
Proposition 4

that the market is not covered, both the

(from the perspective of the supplier in

retailers choose the integrated channel

a simultaneous-channel-choice model):

in equilibrium.

ⅰ) When the consumer’s reservation value,
 , is sufficiently large so that the

When  is sufficiently large (i.e., the market

market is covered, both the retailers

is covered), the equilibrium outcome is that

<Table 3> Outcomes of Quality, Retail Prices, Wholesale Prices, and Suppliers’ Profits
(when the market is covered,  is sufficiently large)
Channel
Structure

II

DD

Quality





Wholesale Price

ID
I

D













N/A





N/A





Retail Price

















Profit

















<Table 4> Outcomes of Retail Prices, Wholesale Prices, and Suppliers’ Profits



(when market is not covered,      )
Structure

Wholesale Price

Retail Price

Profit

II

N/A


  
    



DD


  
    




  
    




  
    


  
     

  
   

I

N/A


  
    



D


  
    




  
    



ID
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both the suppliers choose the decentralized

decisions under different distribution channel

channel. Because the suppliers are Stackelberg

structures. I developed a game-theoretical model

leaders and the market is covered, the wholesale

of duopoly and compared three channel

prices and retail prices under DD are very

structures: II, DD, and ID. I analyzed both

high, while the level of quality is relatively

simultaneous-channel-choice and sequential-

low. This makes their costs relatively low and

channel-choice models. Analyzing different set-

raises profits to the suppliers. When  is

ups helps generate a number of insights into

sufficiently small (i.e., the market is not covered),

the distribution channel decision and quality

both the suppliers are local monopolists and

differentiation.

the equilibrium outcome is that both choose

First, in the presence of competition in retail

the integrated channel. Under II, these suppliers

stores and product quality levels, retailers

choose the same level of quality. The integrated

benefit from an asymmetric channel structure

channel generates high profits to the supplier

when I assume that they both choose the

compared with the decentralized channel because

distribution channel structure simultaneously.

of the double marginalization problem. This

Given this asymmetric channel structure, each

result is consistent with the results of McGuire

retailer chooses a different level of quality, and

and Staelin’s (1983) study. McGuire and Staelin

this quality competition benefits them both by

(1983) show that when demand is independent

softening price competition. Under a Nash

and each firm is a monopolist, the equilibrium

equilibrium, one retailer chooses the integrated

outcome is that each supplier will distribute its

channel and the other retailer chooses the

product through the vertically integrated store.

decentralized channel, or vice versa. However,

When the products are strongly competitive

when both retailers serve as local monopolists,

and each supplier’s demand is strongly influenced

the equilibrium is that both retailers choose the

by its competitor’s strategy, a supplier will be

integrated channel structure because of its

more likely to choose the decentralized channel

higher channel efficiency.

because decentralization can have a “buffer
effect” on competition and thus soften it.

Second, in the simultaneous-channel-choice
model, asymmetric pairs of integrated and
decentralized channel structures are two Nash
equilibria. However, a first-mover advantage

Ⅶ. Conclusion

exists in the sequential-channel-choice model,
with the leader-retailer choosing the integrated
channel and the follower-retailer choosing the

This study examined retailers’ optimal quality

56 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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decentralized channel. Since a leader can anticipate

the follower’s reaction, the leader chooses the

cases in which retailers determine their quality

integrated channel and enjoys higher profits.

and the producer determines its quality.

Third, these results are based on the assumption

While this study adds to the growing literature

that retailers choose their distribution channel

of quality competition, one major limitation in

structures and that the quality decision depends

this study is obviously the lack of generality.

on the channel selected. However, these results

The symmetric channel structure in both II

changed when viewed from the perspective of

(when the two retailers are integrated) and

suppliers choosing their distribution channel

DD (when the two retailers are decentralized)

structures. From this perspective, when

have the symmetric demand functions and the

competition on product quality and retail levels

same cross effects of one retailer’s quality

exists, the equilibrium outcome is that both

change on the other competing retailer’s demand,

suppliers choose the decentralized channel.

consequently. However, the asymmetric channel

Decentralization gives both suppliers the buffer

structure in ID (competition between the

to manage strong competition. When each

integrated and decentralized channels) have

channel acts as a local monopoly, the equilibrium

the asymmetric demand functions and different

outcome is that both suppliers choose the

cross effects of one retailer’s quality change on

integrated channel, which raises channel efficiency

the other competing retailer’s demand because

and generates higher profits to each supplier.

their levels of qualities and prices are different

Overall, the findings of this study contribute

as a result of competition. Further research

to the marketing literature in several ways.

may relax the assumptions for product quality

First, this study investigated the relationship

and demand that are the limitations in this

between product differentiation and channel

study. Moreover, big box stores like Hi-Mart,

structure. Second, it presented a new advantage

Lotte Mart and E-Mart in Korea play a

to decentralization when the quality decision is

dominant role in the retailing industry these

endogenous. Decentralization can help a retailer

days. The dominant retailers are frequently

mitigate fierce price competition if two retailers

the largest distributors for manufacturers (Raju

have asymmetric distribution channel structures

and Zhang 2005). In such a case, the dominant

and differentiated levels of quality. While

retailer may become a Stackelberg price leader.

previous research in the area of quality decisions

The optimal channel structure strategy with

is mainly carried out from the perspective of

consideration of dominant retailers is necessary.

manufacturers (Moorthy 1984; Villas-Boas 1998;

Introducing the dominant retailers into this

Banker et al. 1998; Desai 2001; Netessine and

model would make it more realistic and new

Taylor 2007; Shi et al. 2013), we compare two

managerial insights would be obtained for channel

Effects of Channel Structure on the Quality Competition of Exclusively Distributed Products 57

and marketing managers who are charge in

influence of store image and store brand

selecting store brand vendors.

attitude on store own brand perceptions.
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